Christians are Braver than Philosophers
June 10, 2010
Contemporary analytic philosophy is ambivalent towards what it calls our ‘pre-philosophical convictions.’ A number of recent philosophers have noted that we come to philosophy with a number of convictions already, and we oughtn’t try to hide these. Perhaps we value freedom, perhaps we believe in God, perhaps we are convinced that the world could have been arranged some other way. Either way, these convictions are not strictly the results of philosophical inquiry, but are just convictions that we just have.
A couple of good examples of this way of philosophizing are John Rawls and Alvin Plantinga. John Rawls was deeply committed to a defense of his pre-philosophical convictions about liberal democracy and justice; and Alvin Plantinga is deeply committed to a defense of his pre-philosophical convictions about the existence of the Christian God and the rationality of theistic belief.
Contemporary philosophers are split about whether this new trend (and when I say ‘new’, it’s been going on for 50 years!) is good or bad, but many think it is a positive step, and I’m inclined to agree.
One thing it reveals, though, is how radical the Protestant doctrine of sola scriptura is. Christians are people who are committed to revising potentially any and all of their pre-biblical commitments, if they come to believe that the biblical narrative points us towards some certain truth. How scary is that!
Proof that Christians are braver than philosophers!
Very interesting, Tim. The thing is, unless you’re a super hard-core rationalist, you must admit that pre-philosophical convictions are (not just relevant but) necessary to philosophy. Because, if they’re not, what exactly are you philosophizing about?
You’re point, I think, is not about the relevance of, but about what attitude philosophers should take to, their pre-philosophical convictions. If what you’re saying is that it’s perfectly okay for a philosopher to take as their task the vindication of their pre-philosophical convictions, then that’s uncontroversial. Rawls thought that that was what he was doing, but so did, for example, Kant.
But if what you’re saying is that it’s perfectly okay for a philosopher not to be skeptical of their pre-philosophical convictions, then that’s controversial. Kant said, “look, we all know lying is wrong. But suppose someone didn’t believe lying was wrong.” He approached his convictions from a skeptical perspective and went, “I’m going to show the skeptic why lying is wrong. We start from the premise that …” To me, that sort of skepticism is essential to philosophy. When Socrates asked “what is virtue?” and his interlocutors responded, “courage et al”, he rejected that answer, not because he wasn’t convinced that courage was a virtue, but because they hadn’t answered the philosophical question, which was “suppose I don’t believe that it is, why should I?”
I have another little pedantic point (little and pedantic). I think what you’ve called “sola scriptura” is really the doctrine of biblical inerrancy. Those two things are slightly different. All the disputants in the reformation, Roman Catholics and Protestants, thought that if the bible says it, you have to believe it. That’s inerrancy. Sola scriptura is about whether you have to believe anything on top of what the bible says. The best confessional formulations of sola scriptura are therefore phrased in the negative. Take the 39 Articles, “Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is NOT read therein, NOR may be proved thereby, is NOT to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation” (my emphasis).
But I do agree that biblical inerrancy is a very brave intellectual commitment.
Hey Cam,
Thanks for your thoughts. I can tell this fires of philosophical reflection still burn within you! Thanks particularly for your last, ‘pedantic’ point. I think you’re right, and that is no small distinction to keep in mind.
But I am not as convinced about your first remark. I think philosophers should be open to having their pre-philosophical convictions overturned if they stumble upon good reasons to do so. In fact, this seems to be an implicit condition for getting involved in a fruitful debate with someone. Kant may have thought that lying was wrong, but if his philosophical inquiry turned up good reasons to lie to someone under certain conditions, or given certain outcomes, he ought to revise his original beliefs.
Tim – Great post. Have you read any Van Til, or his more readable student, Greg Bahnsen? Both very strong on this point.
Hey Vaughan, glad you liked it! I have not read either of those writers. I actually haven’t heard of the second guy! Sounds very interesting, any recommendations where to start? Is Van Til an olde-school Lutheran?