Top 9 of 2009

People are beginning to put together those inevitable “Best of 2009…” lists, so I thought I would jump on board the reflective December mood. Here are my Top 9 reads of 2009: the books and articles that had the greatest impact on my thinking this year.

          1.   Myles Burnyeat, ‘Culture and Society in Plato’s Republic‘, Harvard Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 1997

Bernard Williams once said that you are missing out on something if you only ever read Plato in the latest edition of Mind. These lectures are stimulating and expansive that achieve a pretty rare thing – presenting a faithful and historically informed close reading of an important text from the history of philosophy and making its main point seem more important than ever. Unreservedly recommended to everyone – especially those who may have only read about Plato in the latest edition of Mind.

          2.   Richard Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press, 1979)

I owe quite a lot to this book, not least the beginnings of an appreciation of the history of Analytic Philosophy, the development of a Wittgensteinian-type approach to philosophical questions, and the resources to find my way around contemporary epistemology. Recommended to those who think that Analytic Philosophy has to be maths/physics in disguise, ahistorical, and complete with ‘serious’ metaphysical and epistemological aspirations.

          3.   N. T. Wright, Surprised By Hope (SPCK, 2007)

Not only did the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth actually happen, but it matters quite a lot. Loved Wright’s reflections of the purpose of the church, politics, aesthetics and work, and particularly his ability to constructively dismantle stereotypes to allow the story of Jesus to surprise and energize you. Recommended to christians who think that you go to heaven when you die, so you may as well buy that SUV now.

          4.   N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (Fortress Press, 1992)

Wright presents the completely uncontroversial thesis that Jesus was a Jewish Man and that First-Century AD Judaism was a complex and rich culture in a way that opens up the Gospel accounts of Jesus’ life and words in a new way. Recommended to any Christian that hasn’t read the Gospels in a long time, or any non believer who thinks that they know basically what the story of Jesus is about.

          5.   John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993)

Abstract, Confusing, Infuriating, Suprising…and just a little inspirational.

          6. Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1989)

O’Neill did a lot to fill in my knowledge of Kant. Whilst every philosopher is caricatured, Kant is caricatured a lot! This book presents a plausible and suprising treatment of Kant’s ethics and politics, and offers a terrific construal of his themes of objectivity, universalizability, and reason.

          7.  John McDowell, Mind and World (Harvard University Press, 1994)

A brilliant example of the kind of Analytic Philosophy I am more and more sympathetic towards. Wittgensteinian in approach, more humanistic than mathematical, and attempting to bring the history of philosophy in touch with current work.

          8. Gary Gutting, Foucault: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2005)

I really don’t know enough about Foucault to judge Gutting’s portrait of him in this book. Perhaps the best thing I can say about this book is that it made me want to read a lot more Foucault. Contains several fascinating presentations of his themes, and seems to shy away from simplification and caricature at every step.

          9. Simon Critchley, Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2001)

The difference between Continental and Analytic Philosophy is the difference in how you read Kant. A bold thesis that I was quite convinced by.

My Thesis Question or What I’ve Been Doing All Year

If you have asked me at some stage during this year what I am researching for my M.Phil thesis, chances are I rambled off something about Plato, Richard Rorty, Politics, or the very purpose of philosophy itself, and then subtly insisted that we change the topic. ‘How are things with you?’ I might have politely asked. The reason for this is because I had no thesis question, and this was quite the thorn in my side. Or at least the gumnut in my boot.

But thanks (a lot!) to  a couple of productive meetings with my supervisor over the past month, I am now at a position where I have a sketch of my thesis question. So here it is, recorded in black and white for your interest and my sanity: Tim’s M.Phil thesis proposal -

Edification and Excellence: On Richard Rorty’s Platonism

1. Myles Burnyeat has suggested that contemporary professional analytic philosophy is characterized by the practice of insulation. That is, the practise of inquiring into philosophical propositions and theories which the inquirer is not actually committed to living out. As a result of this, the contemporary analytic philosopher has no reason to suppose that the results of her inquiry will impact upon her life, or anyone else’s life, in any significant way. It is merely theoretical. Burnyeat suggests that this widespread practice of insulation is, for the most part, what sets contemporary analytic philosophy apart from ancient philosophy. It is important to notice that this is a metaphilosophical claim: it is claim which takes a step back from actual philosophical projects and aims to say something about the very act of philosophizing.
2. The work of American philosopher Richard Rorty (1931-2007) can be interpreted as a sustained attempt to critique and move beyond this practise of insulation. In this way, Rorty can be read as reclaiming an ancient philosophical paradigm in which philosophy ought to conceive of itself and be practised today.
3. A significant dimension to Rorty’s philosophy is that he calls for the abandonment of what he takes to be fruitless metaphysical inquires, and for philosophy to reconcieve itself as strongly, perhaps even pre-eminently, engaged in ’cultural criticism’.
4. However, for all his insight, I think Rorty undermines his own project and misconstrues what ‘cultural criticism’ is. Particularly, by insisting that philosophy and literature are basically two ways of doing the same thing – of helping people get by. Through an examination of Platonic philosophy, particularly it’s political, metaphilosophical and dialectical themes, as well as the idea of the philosopher as some sort of expert, I will seek to show how Rorty’s proposal can be mended and extended by drawing more deeply on the paradigm he implicitly re-introduces to contemporary analytic philosophy. First (and perhaps solely!) this will involve an investigation of: A) In what sense is a philosopher an expert? Is this necessarily a metaphysical claim? and B) What is ‘cultural criticism’ anyway? Ought this be a dimension of all philosophical activity.
5. In all this, I hope to defend and articulate a metaphilosophical position which develops and elucidates Rorty’s idea of philosophy as cultural criticism, and which makes room for a political dimension to all philosophical inquiry. In the process I hope to suggest what ‘Platonism’ and ‘ancient philosophy’ are, and how they may still be of importance to contemporary analytic philosophy. The thesis title is Edification and Excellence, since, in a nutshell, these two words respectively grasp on to what is central in Rorty and Plato’s philosophy. Rorty held that philosophy is meant to be therapeutic, it is meant to help you get by, it is meant to build you up; Plato held that philosophy is meant  to help you discover and realize what is best. I audaciously hope to offer a symbiotic synthesis of these two metaphilosophical ideas.

Comments very welcome.

On Living Your Philosophy

Nowadays, if a philosopher finds he cannot answer the philosophical question ‘What is time?’ or ‘Is time real?’, he applies for a research grant to work on the problem during next year’s sabbatical. He does not suppose that the arrival of next year is actually in doubt. He insulates his ordinary first order judgments from the effects of his philosophizing

– Myles Burnyeat, The Original Sceptics (1998), p. 92

I recently attended an open lecture at the Presbyterian Theological Centre, in which UK philosopher/theologian/blogger Paul Helm spoke about the intellectual biography of John Calvin. One of his central points was that although Calvin wrote in the sixteenth century, his writings are much more at home in and indebted to the world of ancient thought, rather than modern thought. Helm suggested that it makes more sense to read him in light of Plato, the Stoics and Augustine, then it does to read him in light of medieval, early modern or Enlightenment figures. Helm used the above quote from the brilliant classicist and philosopher Myles Burnyeat to bring all this into focus.

Burnyeat argues that what classified the ancient philosophers was a commitment to live their philosophy.  These days, he says, philosophical activity is thought to be more theoretical inquiry then it is life guiding wisdom. Philosophers are expected to write logically tight, rigorously argued, interesting and abstract papers, rather than wander the market place in search of an honest man (like Diogenes did), or heroically stare death in the face because you are convinced of the maxim that nothing can harm a good man after death (like Socrates did).

Helm’s point was that Calvin bought into this ancient conception of philosophy, and it permeated his thinking about religion. Religion is far from a theoretical, cool, abstract, detached type of inquiry (at one point, Helm surprisingly stated that Calvin derisively refers to this kind of activity as ‘theology!’), but religion is meant to energize and guide your life, it is meant to be the practical wisdom that you consult in all things.

I found this to be a really interesting suggestion from Helm, and one I will keep in mind as I read Plato and (hopefully!) Calvin/Calvinists. But I suspect that his allegedly neutral-historical-lecture had an implicitly pointy provocation.

I felt like Helm was suggesting that those Christians who claim to stand in Calvin’s legacy ought to think about whether they are of a similar frame of mind. Do we tend to insulate our first order beliefs from our religious convictions? Do we live our religion? Are we more like the ancient philosophers whose knowledge and thoughts led them to do certain (crazy!) things? Or are we more like the insulated academic who professes to be a specialist in radical theories of time, but has no doubts that tomorrow will come like it always has? Are we insulating ourselves from our knowledge of God in the face of Jesus Christ?